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Abstract—Computer networks and more specifically wireless 
communication networks are increasingly becoming susceptible 
to more sophisticated and untraceable attacks. Most of the cur-
rent Intrusion Detection Systems either focus on just one layer of 
observation or use a limited number of metrics without proper 
data fusion techniques. However, the true status of a network is 
rarely accurately detectable by examining only one network 
layer. This paper describes a synergistic approach of fusing deci-
sions of whether an attack takes place by using multiple meas-
urements from different layers of wireless communication net-
works. The described method is implemented on a live system 
that monitors a wireless network in real time and gives an indica-
tion of whether a malicious frame exists or not. This is achieved 
by analysing specific metrics and comparing them 
against historical data. The proposed system assigns for each 
metric a belief of whether an attack takes place or not. The be-
liefs from different metrics are fused with the Dempster-Shafer 
technique with the ultimate goal of limiting false alarms by com-
bining beliefs from various network layers. The on-line experi-
mental results show that cross-layer techniques and data fusion 
perform more efficiently compared to conventional methods. 
Keywords-Cross-layer measurements; Data fusion; Dempster-
Shafer; Wireless attacks; Wi-Fi 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
In the last few years, computer networks and more specifi-
cally wireless communication networks are increasingly be-
coming susceptible to more sophisticated and untraceable at-
tacks. The number of attacks and intrusion attempts that target 
wireless networks are constantly increasing. Therefore, finding 
a major solution for securing the wireless networks against 
these attacks has become a priority for researchers. 
The implementation of network monitoring tools, such as 
Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs), is fundamental in security 
infrastructures, especially in wireless networks, in order to pro-
vide another level of defence for detecting such attacks and 
protecting the network systems. The final goal of the IDSs is to 
identify malicious frames that circulate through the wireless 
network as actual attacks, and to not misinterpret legitimate 
frames as malicious. However, these tools do not prevent the 
attacks or intrusions from occurring. 
As explained in more detail in [9], IDS are generally cate-
gorised as anomaly and misuse intrusion detection. The former 
tries to generate a profile of normal utilisation of the wireless 
resources, and raises an intrusion alarm if the analysed wireless 
traffic deviates from this normal profile. Anomaly IDSs are 
able to detect attacks not previously known. However, they can 
generate high rates of False Positive (FP) alarms. Alternatively, 
misuse IDS uses signatures of known attacks to identify at-
tacks. This methodology generates low rates of FP, but is un-
able to detect novel attacks, leading to a high rate of False 
Negatives (FN). 
Despite all the advances in developing IDSs, wireless net-
work systems keep suffering from numerous attacks. This af-
firmation is based on different and miscellaneous reasons. One 
reason is because most of the implemented approaches are 
misuse IDS. As commented above, this method lacks effi-
ciency in detecting novel attacks. Another reason is that many 
researchers, e.g. [10], keep evaluating their systems in an off-
line environment by using the dataset from KDD’99 cup [11]. 
Undoubtedly that this dataset is very useful for evaluating the 
systems because it provides a framework in which the number 
and type of attacks is accurately known. However, this ap-
proach remains an in vitro process, and does not consider the 
profile of real data traffic of a network. Finally, and more im-
portantly for our presented study, most of the current IDSs ei-
ther focus on just one layer of observation (i.e. MAC layer) or 
use a limited number of metrics without proper data fusion 
techniques. However, the true status of a network is rarely ac-
curately detectable by examining only one network layer. 
As many researchers have previously demonstrated [3, 5], a 
cross-layer approach may offer a collaborative decision among 
layers, potentially resulting in higher detection accuracy rate 
with lower numbers of FN and FP. Hence, utilising a cross-
layer approach may help towards automating the overall proc-
ess of detecting and mitigating wireless network attacks. 
In this work, we address a fundamental classification prob-
lem found in computer monitoring. This is determining 
whether a captured frame is of malicious intent or not. In order 
to leverage the knowledge from multiple measurements across 
multiple layers, data fusion techniques are used and specifically 
Dempster-Shafer (D-S). D-S has been used before in the com-
puter monitoring field with the purpose of combining beliefs of 
the same metric at the same layer among nodes [1, 2]. 
It should be noted that the proposed methodology has been 
implemented in a real system running on-line and giving re-
sults in real time. The actual system consists of a computer 
with a wireless card on a monitoring mode that collects frames 
with the TShark [8] open source tool. The proposed algorithm 
takes as input the raw monitoring information, isolates specific 
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metrics from multiple layers and applies a data fusion tech-
nique that calculates the ultimate probability of whether an 
attack is taking place or not. 
The contribution of this work is that, in contrast to the cur-
rent work [1, 2, 3], the proposed methodology in this paper 
combines metrics from multiple layers and fuses the informa-
tion with the D-S technique for a synergistic approach towards 
detecting attacks in wireless networks. The aim of our method-
ology requires the system to be of low cost and online, scalable 
and the concept should be applicable to other wireless tech-
nologies apart from the tested IEEE 802.11 standard. 
The paper is organised as follows. An explanation of the D-
S data fusion algorithm along with its advantages and disad-
vantages is given in section II. The methodology and testbed 
are presented in section III. In section IV the results obtained 
with the proposed methodology are discussed and compared 
against single or dual combination of metrics. Finally, conclu-
sions are given in section V. 
II. DEMPSTER-SHAFER THEORY 
A. Mathematical Framework 
Dempster-Shafer theory of evidence method is a discipline 
of mathematics that combines evidence of information from 
multiple and heterogeneous events in order to calculate the 
probability of occurrence of another event. 
The D-S theory starts by assuming a Universe of Discourse 
Θ = {θ1, θ2,..., θn}, also called a Frame of Discernment, which 
is a finite set of all possible mutually exclusive propositions 
and hypotheses about some problem domain. 
With regards to this work, the frame of discernment is 
comprised of A = “Attack” and N = “Normal”. Assuming Θ has 
two outcomes {A, N}, the total number of subsets of Θ, defined 
by the number of hypotheses that it composes, is 2
Θ
 = {A, N, 
{A|N}, Ø} 
Each proposition (subset) from Θ is assigned a probability 
or a confidence interval within [0, 1], by an observer from the 
mass probability function , also known as the basic probabil-
ity assignment: 
 
                         
 
 
 
 
        
            
        
   
  
 
The function       is defined as A’s basic probability 
number. It describes the measure of belief that is committed 
exactly to hypothesis A. 
In order to define the confidence interval that is given to a 
certain event, two functions must first be defined. These are the 
Belief function (   ) and the Plausibility function (  ). The 
former is a belief measure of a hypothesis A, and it sums the 
mass value of all the non-empty subsets of A. 
 
              
   
           
 
The doubt function (   ) is given by 
 
                       
     
 
 
which accounts for all evidence that rule out the given 
proposition represented by A. 
Similarly, the    function takes into account all the evi-
dence that does not rule out the given proposition. In other 
words, it expresses how much we should believe in A if all 
currently unknown facts were to support A. 
 
                
 
Thus, the true belief in hypothesis A will be along the inter-
val [      ,      ]. However, in practice, the values of the 
interval could be identical and therefore the interval becomes a 
unique value. 
The idea behind the D-S rule of combination is to fuse the 
belief from two different observers into one given hypothesis. 
TABLE I.  EXAMPLE EVENT PROBABILITIES ASSIGNED BY   AND   
      {A}: 0.32 {N}: 0.25 {A, N}: 0.43 
{A}: 0.35 0.11 0.09 0.15 
{N}: 0.1 0.03 0.025 0.04 
{A, N}: 0.55 0.18 0.14 0.24 
 
 
Let   and   be the basic probability assignments from 
observer 1 and 2 respectively. The cells in the above table rep-
resent the multiplication of the    belief with the    belief, 
horizontal and vertical axis, respectively. 
Their orthogonal            , is defined as 
 
      
                 
                   
                               
 
If the denominator of eq. (1) is equal to zero, K = 0, then 
      does not exist and   and   are said to be totally or 
flatly contradictory. 
To easily understand how to apply the D-S algorithm, a real 
example from our measurements is presented. The basic prob-
abilities for an event being “Attack”, “Normal”, and “Uncer-
tain”, can be tabulated as seen in Table I. 
Firstly K is calculated from eq. (1):           
          . Similarly,          . As described in eq. 
(1), for any event E the combined belief is given by: 
 
     
 
 
             
     
 
 
Therefore, 
 
                                
                                   
                          
 
According to the results, the hypothesis more likely to be 
true is A, with higher belief than the other hypotheses. 
 B. Advantages and Disadvantages 
Among the different methods such as Bayesian or Principal 
Component Analysis, the D-S theory of evidence was chosen 
as the data fusion method for three clear reasons. Firstly, D-S is 
able to combine evidence from multiple and heterogeneous 
sources. Second, D-S is suitable for detecting previously un-
seen attacks because it does not require a priori knowledge. 
Finally, and more importantly, D-S method provides the ability 
of managing and assigning probability to ignorance, which 
allows tackling a large range of problems. 
In contrast, Bayesian inference requires a priori knowledge 
and does not allow allocation of probability to ignorance but 
only to an event being normal or abnormal [4]. 
Nevertheless, there are two main drawbacks associated with 
the D-S algorithm. First, the high computation complexity and 
second the conflicting beliefs management. The computational 
complexity increases exponentially with the number of possi-
ble event outcomes (Θ). If there are   elements in Θ, there will 
be up to 2
n
 - 1 focal elements for the mass functions, ignoring 
Ø. The combination of two mass functions needs the computa-
tion of up to 2
n
 intersections [4]. 
The frame of discernment in the proposed methodology in-
cludes two elements (   ), normal and abnormal, and there-
fore there will be three focal elements of belief functions, 2
2
 = 
{Attack, Normal, {Attack | Normal}, Ø}. By using only three 
elements in the focal elements, the fusion method requires low 
computational complexity. 
The conflicting belief phenomenon is nicely illustrated with 
an example from [4]. Given three events, {A, B, C} and two 
sensors, Sensor 1 might assign         ,          and 
        as beliefs in A, B and C respectively. Similarly, 
Sensor 2 might assign       ,           and      
    as beliefs in A, B and C. Applying the D-S algorithm on 
these values, the rule of combination will result with a higher 
belief in event B, which is clearly wrong. In the proposed de-
tection algorithm of this work, each event is assigned a non-
zero mass function and therefore the belief conflict phenome-
non is not an issue. 
III. METHODOLOGY 
A. Attack Description 
The most common and straight forward method for an at-
tacker to perform a Man-in-the-Middle (MitM)  attack is to do 
first MAC spoofing, usually by performing an ARP poisoning 
attack (i.e. the attacker sends messages indicating that he owns 
a specific MAC address). This is a well known MAC layer 
attack. For the purposes of this work, a MitM attack between 
an Access Point (AP) and a client, implemented by the Airpwn 
tool [6], was used experimented. 
Airpwn takes advantage of the Round Trip Time (RTT) that 
a web server takes to respond to normal webpage requests. In 
that lag time, it can inject its own content onto the wireless 
channel of an AP. If an attacker near the victim is running the 
Airpwn tool, it will see the legal request from the client and 
immediately respond with its own HTML code. Due to the fact 
that there are no hops between the attacker and the victim, it 
takes the attacker much less time to respond. When the client 
receives the data, it will assume the original request was an-
swered and process the injected code. 
 
Figure 1.  Testbed and steps of attack for Airpwn. 
When the client receives the data, it will assume the origi-
nal request was answered by the legal AP and process the in-
jected code. Even though the attack is launched at the applica-
tion layer by injecting an HTTP packet, the actual attack is 
practical only because there are no mechanisms in the IEEE 
802.11 standard to prevent a misbehaving node from injecting 
their own malicious code in the form of valid WiFi frames. 
Using scripts, Airpwn injects carefully crafted response 
code that could cause harm of varying severity. Less dangerous 
effects to the victim could include replacing the advert contents 
of a specific website with different ones; more dangerous activ-
ity could include redirecting the victim web browser to a phish-
ing type of web site. 
In our experiments, one type of attack was launched against 
the client. This attack code was a default option in the Airpwn 
suite. In this attack, the attacker listens for requests for images 
hosted on the web site and injects its own images. In addition, 
the attacker injects Reset (RST) frames in the TCP layer, mak-
ing the client to request the remaining objects of the web site. 
B. Testbed and Methodology 
The testbed where the experiments took place can be seen 
in Fig. 1. It includes a client associated with an AP and access-
ing webpages hosted on the Internet across different geo-
graphical locations. These are China, Spain, UK and two dif-
ferent webpages hosted in US. For the purpose of detecting the 
attacks, a computer with a wireless card on monitoring mode 
utilised the TShark monitoring software for collecting frames. 
The monitoring node and the attacker were running the Back-
Track Linux operating system and all the devices except from 
the AP used Atheros chipset in their wireless cards. The AP 
was a Cisco Linksys model WRT54GL. 
The captured metrics of the monitoring node include all in-
formation transmitted between the AP and the client, but also 
include the injected malicious frames from the attacker. From 
all the collected information, three metrics were identified that 
if appropriately used could give evidence of a MitM attack. 
These metrics are the Received Signal Strength Indication 
(RSSI), the Injection Rate (or Transmission Rate), and the 
Time To Live (TTL) value. 
Both, the TShark monitoring process and our attack detec-
tor process were concurrently launched in the computer acting 
as the monitor. When the wireless card listen a frame, TShark 
monitoring tool identifies and isolates the respective RSSI, 
Injection Rate and TTL of each single frame. These metrics 
values were the input of the attack detector process, which ap-
plied the D-S method for deciding whether the current analysed 
frame is legitimate or malicious. 
 It should be noted that the attacker was placed very close to 
the AP, around 1.5 meters away. This positioning of the 
equipment made the detection of attacks much more difficult as 
the RSSI values of the attacker could become identical to these 
of the AP. The proposed methodology can be seen as a flow 
chart in Fig. 2. 
The attack detector process that we apply in our methodol-
ogy is explained here in more detail. From the information 
within the captured frames, the statistical mode of RSSI, TTL 
and Injection Rate is calculated for a specific frame window 
size. In our experiments we used 20 frames for generating the 
mode. The metrics values of RSSI, TTL and Injection Rate 
from every captured frame are compared against the statistical 
mode of the current frames window. The beliefs for the hy-
potheses Attack and Normal are dependent on the distance of 
the value of each metric of the current frame from the calcu-
lated mode. The actual values of each belief are chosen ex-
perimentally and the intuition behind this is that the longer the 
distance from the mode, the higher the belief in the hypotheses 
Attack as this indicates a departure from the normality. 
In order to evaluate our proposed methodology, the time in-
stance and the number of malicious frames for each experiment 
are known by manually analysing the captured files. Therefore, 
the results of FP and FN can easily be constructed. 
Our proposed methodology performs the detection in an 
online mode, in which the metric values of the captured frames 
are fed as input to the proposed algorithm for analysis, one by 
one, which automatically gives a belief of whether each frame 
is malicious or not. According to these beliefs, our proposed 
methodology performs the decision making in real-time, for 
every single frame, of whether an attack is taking place or not. 
IV. PRACTICAL RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
In this section the results from the proposed cross-layer 
methodology are presented and compared against single layer 
metrics and against the cross-layer technique using just two 
metrics. The results are evaluated by comparing the FN, FP and 
the Overall Success Rate (OSR). The OSR is the number of 
correct classifications divided by the total number of classifica-
tions as described in [7]. It should be noted that the perform-
ance of a technique should be judged by considering all metrics 
FP, FN and OSR. Considering just the OSR metric is mislead-
ing as OSR is heavily influenced by the performance of FP 
while mostly ignoring the performance of FN. 
The cross-layer results are presented in Table II and are the 
best results overall and for each individual experiment. The 
algorithm detects all malicious frames except for some FN and 
FP results that occur while launching the Airpwn attack, when 
the client visits the UK and US_01 websites. Some FP results 
occur when the client visits the US_02 website, while launch-
ing the attack. These false alarms occur because the value of 
the used metrics, RSSI, Injection Rate and TTL, coincide with 
the values of the estimated mode. This happens because con-
secutive injected forged frames skew the value of the estimated 
mode away from the mode value of legitimate frames. In other 
words, the malicious frames outnumber the normal frames and 
therefore the estimated mode corresponds to the malicious 
frames rather than the legitimate frames. 
 
 
Figure 2.  Methodology flowchart. 
As a result, the values of all metrics derived from the attack 
frames are close or similar to the estimated mode, producing a 
high number of FN. For the same reason, the distance of all the 
metrics values of the legitimate frames from the mode in-
creases. This in turn results in a higher number of FP. 
In the case of double metrics RSSI and Injection Rate (Ta-
ble III) the results are of poor performance with high FN per-
centage reaching almost 27% in two cases. The results present 
also a high number of FP. However, five of these FP are lower 
than 1%, and all of them lower than 4%. 
The combination of the metrics TTL and Injection Rate, 
presented in Table IV, produces overall results very similar to 
Table III. In that case, the percentages of FN and FP are 
slightly higher than the previous case. 
In the case of the single metric TTL (Table V) the detection 
accuracy clearly decreases in comparison to all the other pre-
sented results. It is noteworthy that all of the experiments gen-
erate a FN percentage higher that 3%, reaching 22% in one of 
the cases. The results of using the single metric Injection Rate 
and RSSI are not presented. However, it is worthy to say that 
the detection accuracy of both procedures are overall similar to 
the results of the single metric TTL. 
These results are a clear example showcasing that the com-
bination of beliefs from different metrics yields an improved 
performance. 
V. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
This paper argues that the conventional approach of using 
single metrics for detecting attacks in wireless networks is 
sometimes inefficient, inaccurate and misleading. Similarly, 
techniques involving multiple metrics without utilising a 
proper data fusion technique lack efficiency. To this aim, the 
authors of this work have proposed a new approach for detect-
ing wireless network attacks, involving combining beliefs from 
sensors of multiple layers of observation to produce a collec-
tive decision on whether an attack is taking place or not. 
The beliefs from different metrics are combined with the 
Dempster-Shafer theory of evidence, a mathematical frame-
work for the representation of uncertainty, with the ultimate 
goal of limiting false alarms and improving the overall per-
formance. 
TABLE II.  CROSS LAYER RESULTS UTILISING RSSI, INJ. RATE AND TTL 
Web Site Type OSR (%) 
False Neg. 
(%) 
False Pos. 
(%) 
China 
Normal 100 0 0 
Attack 100 0 0 
Spain 
Normal 100 0 0 
Attack 100 0 0 
UK 
Normal 100 0 0 
Attack 90.45 9.55 4.70 
US_01 
Normal 100 0 0 
Attack 85.71 14.29 3.71 
US_02 
Normal 100 0 0 
Attack 100 0 0.08 
 
TABLE III.  DUAL METRIC RESULTS UTILISING INJ. RATE AND RSSI 
Web Site Type OSR (%) 
False Neg. 
(%) 
False Pos. 
(%) 
China 
Normal 100 0 0 
Attack 100 0 0.24 
Spain 
Normal 100 0 0.35 
Attack 73.33 26.67 3.73 
UK 
Normal 100 0 0.49 
Attack 73.17 26.83 2.59 
US_01 
Normal 100 0 0 
Attack 100 0 0.75 
US_02 
Normal 100 0 0.29 
Attack 91.84 8.16 1.22 
 
TABLE IV.  DUAL METRIC RESULTS UTILISING INJ. RATE AND TTL 
Web Site Type OSR (%) 
False Neg. 
(%) 
False Pos. 
(%) 
China 
Normal 100 0 0.04 
Attack 100 0 0.43 
Spain 
Normal 100 0 0 
Attack 93.33 6.67 0.77 
UK 
Normal 100 0 1.17 
Attack 95.62 4.38 1.78 
US_01 
Normal 100 0 0.27 
Attack 82.35 17.65 3.85 
US_02 
Normal 100 0 2.33 
Attack 78.74 21.26 5.76 
 
In this paper, the authors have demonstrated experimentally 
on a real wireless network that combining beliefs in real time 
from multiple metrics in various layers outperforms the effi-
ciency and accuracy of single metrics. For detecting the in-
jected attacks, the cross-layer results are the best for each indi-
vidual experiment. The FN results are produced because con-
secutive injected forged frames skew the value of the estimated 
mode away from the mode value of legitimate frames. Clearly, 
this is a conceptual issue of window based algorithms. 
TABLE V.  SINGLE METRIC RESULTS UTILISING TTL 
Web Site Type OSR (%) 
False Neg. 
(%) 
False Pos. 
(%) 
China 
Normal 100 0 4.06 
Attack 100 0 2.74 
Spain 
Normal 100 0 5.24 
Attack 100 0 5.22 
UK 
Normal 100 0 14.58 
Attack 97.50 2.50 20.73 
US_01 
Normal 100 0 9.60 
Attack 97.37 2.63 6.67 
US_02 
Normal 100 0 22.26 
Attack 87.32 12.68 12.42 
 
As for future work, an important issue to consider is how to 
automate the assignment of beliefs and the adaptive selection 
of appropriate metrics using data mining techniques. In addi-
tion, the authors are planning to examine other types of wire-
less attacks. 
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